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Abstract: Learning from operational experience is a process that has arisen as a result of the 
need in industry to manage the increasing complexity of technical systems. While 
dependability was initially dominant, limitations in its ability to account for human variability 
have gradually become apparent. The use of the human and organisational factors paradigm 
emerged in an attempt to overcome these limitations, and learning from operational 
experience has evolved out of this. This evolution led to a shift of interest towards the 
influence of the work environment on human performance. The CREAM method, structured 
by the Common Performance Conditions (CPCs), is a major example of this trend. This paper 
discusses the design and deployment of an accident analysis grid developed in 2008 by a 
major French gas distribution company. This grid was a response to the company’s decision 
to revitalise the learning from operational experience process through the use of human and 
organisational factors. 
Keywords: gas network management, human and organisational factors, CREAM, common 
performance conditions, accident analysis. 
1. Introduction 
This paper describes the design, development and deployment of an accident analysis grid 
that incorporates human and organisational factors. The grid is based on Hollnagel’s CREAM 
method (1998) and a specific use of Common Performance Conditions (CPCs; Hollnagel, 
ibid.), known as the screening technique. The context for the deployment of the grid is the 
French gas distribution industry. This business is characterised by a high level of risk, a rather 
prescriptive use of procedures and an approach to accident analysis that tends to focus on 
technical components. In this context, the introduction of CPCs reflected the company’s 
desire to improve safety management by broadening the spectrum of causes of accidents. 
However, in practice, the introduction of CPCs had effects that went beyond these technical 
aspects and brought about a profound change in the paradigm of the accident and its 
aetiology. The technical content of the method and the changes it provoked will be described 
in this paper. 
The accident analysis grid presented here is the result of two years of research and 
development carried out by a working group composed of the Risk Management Centre at 
GrDF, the Centre for research on Risks and Crises (Mines ParisTech) and the Department of 
Research and Innovation of GDF-SUEZ. 
1.1. GrDF (Gaz réseau distribution France) 
GrDF was created on 31st December, 2007. It is a 100% subsidiary of GDF-SUEZ and 
manages all activities related to natural gas distribution in France. With nearly 46,000 
employees and 190,000 kilometres of network, it serves 11 million customers. Such a 
business faces many safety challenges. Two main areas of activity have been identified as the 
cause of accidents or structural damage: 
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 Management of the network supervised by GrDF. This is the responsibility of the 
operational manager who manages all access to the network required for maintenance. 
Maintenance teams are either GrDF employees or contractors.  Work carried out by external companies. These may either be carried out under the 
supervision of GrDF or independently. Companies must refer to GrDF for maps of the 
network at the location where work is to be carried out. 
The effects of structural damage vary widely. The most benign affect only the physical 
aspects of a facility, and costs are low. For instance; a pipe feeding a domestic property can be 
repaired for less than five hundred euros, including materials and travel expenses. In contrast, 
the most serious accidents can result in the death of GrDF employees or members of the 
public, particularly in the case of an explosion. With such high human and material stakes, 
learning from past events is essential to ensure the safety of distribution. The accident analysis 
grid described in this article focuses on CPCs. The goal for the company is to use this tool to 
strengthen their ability to learn from operational experience. This training is crucial to the 
performance of the company since it operates in an open environment which is subject to 
numerous interventions from outside contractors.  
1.2. Lessons from the past and learning from operational experience 
Hollnagel (2006) identifies the process of learning from the past as one of the four core 
capabilities of a resilient organisation. In the field of industrial safety, this feature allows an 
organisation to limit the recurrence of events and/or manage their consequences. 
For GrDF and the industry in general, training is often operationalised in the form of learning 
from experience. It is defined by Rakoto (2004) as a “structured approach to the capitalisation 
and exploitation of information resulting from the analysis of positive and/or negative events. 
It implements a set of human and technological resources that must be managed in such a way 
as to reduce the repetition of errors and to promote good practice”. 
The nuclear industry has played a pioneering role in research into and consolidation of the 
concept of learning from operational experience. It is defined by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (2006) as a tool “…to report, investigate, evaluate, trend, correct and utilize 
information in relation to abnormal events [...] and to disseminate this information to the 
relevant governmental bodies, national and international organizations and the public”. The 
aviation industry is also very active in sharing information related to incidents and accidents. 
The database of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) provides an opportunity for 
pilots and air traffic controllers to submit incident analyses, anonymously and without 
sanction. The purpose of this organisation, through its publications, is to supply data on the 
most common risks to the relevant aviation safety authorities in the United States. 
According to van Wassenhove (2009), learning from operational experience can be structured 
into four phases:  detection of the problem and collection of information;  analysis;  formalisation and capitalisation of knowledge; and  sharing and reuse of knowledge. 
This article only discusses the analysis phase, since it is at this stage that our accident analysis 
grid is used. 
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1.3. Outline of the paper 
This article continues (section 2) with a description of the evolution of accident analysis 
methods. While such methods were initially structured around the study of technical 
components, they have increasingly focused on the analysis of human reliability. Later, 
second-generation methods were specifically designed to integrate the contextual 
determinants of human performance. 
Section 3 describes a specific second-generation method, namely CREAM, developed by 
Hollnagel (1998). CREAM implements the concept of Common Performance Conditions 
(CPCs). These will be explained in detail in order to highlight the link with the analysis aimed 
at by GrDF. Section 4 describes the design and deployment of the grid which was developed 
during a process of ‘participatory prototyping’. It demonstrates the added value provided by 
this tool. Section 5 discusses the limitations and benefits of the introduction of the grid 
following its deployment and in the first two years of use. Section 6 describes the trade-offs 
and side effects of the grid in everyday use, and Section 7 reflects on some of the lessons 
learned. 
2. Reliability analysis methods 
This section briefly describes the evolution of reliability analysis methods. It aims at 
presenting the evolution of ideas within the field of accident analysis, and how the analysis of 
human performance progressively came about.  
2.1. First-generation human reliability analysis methods 
Accident analysis methods assess the interaction between human activity and performance 
conditions. The relationship between these two variables is determined by the underlying 
accident model. One approach is to view human error as the main cause of events. Fault tree 
analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) are methods 
representative of this school of thought that considers performance conditions to be a 
background issue. The cause remains associated with the individual and accidents are 
primarily the result of human error. 
However, the same variables permit another approach. Human reliability assessment (HRA) 
methods put forward the principle that human error is the result of unfavourable performance 
conditions. Therefore, the analysis initially focuses on the context and it is only later that 
modes of human error are associated with it. The THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate 
Prediction; Swain, 1964) method is an example of this approach. Human error remains a 
determining factor. However, it only impacts the system through its association with external 
factors such as procedures or the condition of equipment. Analysis begins with a description 
of the system, its normal mode of operation and the effect of a malfunction on each of its 
operations. All human interventions in the system are then examined. By matching human 
error probability tables with these interventions, it is possible to determine the impact of each 
of these errors on the system. 
2.2. Second-generation methods 
The difficulty of quantifying a base rate probability for human error has proven to be a 
major hurdle. This difficulty has led to a new generation of human reliability assessment 
methods that re-visit the problem. In these methods, human error is no longer modelled as a 
base rate probability modulated by context, but as a direct consequence of the context. 
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Performance is then defined through concepts such as the Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSFs) developed by Swain & Guttman (1983). The notion of context has been incorporated 
into the CREAM method using the term Common Performance Conditions (CPCs). For both 
CPCs and PSFs the assumption is the same: failure is the outcome of unfavourable 
conditions1.  
This approach represents a radical change in the modelling of humans in systems. The 
consequences of this view of performance are twofold. On the one hand, the idea of 
performance conditions makes it possible to bypass the concept of human error: avoiding the 
recurrence of unwanted events can be achieved by removing the conditions that cause poor 
performance. On the other hand, the idea of performance conditions enables managers to 
distance themselves from a search for those responsible and the imposition of sanctions, 
through the implementation of a ‘new approach’ to humans (see Dekker et al., 2007). 
3. The CREAM method 
CREAM is a second-generation HRA method developed by Hollnagel (1998). It belongs to 
the human reliability analysis discipline. It is a part of a long history of models and methods 
in which the concept of causation has greatly evolved. Like other methods of the same 
generation, CREAM puts forward the idea that operational failures are contingent upon the 
conditions under which actions are carried out. The method can be deployed in the context of 
risk assessment; Fujita & Hollnagel (2004) describe such a use. Alternatively CREAM can be 
used for accident analysis. For that use, two versions of the method exist. The extended 
version operates at the level of fine-grained cognitive functions, while the basic method, 
known as the screening technique, is based on the analysis of CPCs. The approach described 
in this article uses the simpler version of the method. 
CREAM itself is a generic method. Various other versions have been developed, tailored to 
the needs of particular fields or industries. A variant of the method, DREAM (Driver 
Reliability and Error Analysis Method) was developed for driving (Ljung, 2002). Another 
example is BREAM (Bridge Reliability and Error Analysis Method), described by Qureshi 
(2007), and developed for the analysis of accidents in the field of merchant shipping. 
In CREAM, CPCs enable an analysis to be made of the context in which work is carried out 
(Table 1). CPCs are used to analyse the working environment using characteristics that are 
applicable to many areas of activity. The premise of CREAM is that when CPCs are 
unfavourable, the level of control over the activity decreases, and along with it, the level of 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
1 Note that the precision of modelling humans via PSFs or CPCs relies on some form of validation of their 
effects on performance. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no single answer on what could 
be a reliable source of data for such a validation. In practice, a combination of databases, simulations and expert 
judgement is used. 
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Table 1: List of CPCs, assessment options and their expected effects. 
CPC Level/descriptors 
Expected effect on 
performance reliability 
Adequacy of organisation Very efficient 
Efficient 
Inefficient 
Deficient 
Improved  
Not Significant  
Reduced  
Reduced 
Working conditions Advantageous 
Compatible 
Incompatible 
Improved  
Not Significant  
Reduced 
Adequacy of man-machine interface (MMI) 
and operational support 
Supportive 
Adequate 
Tolerable 
Inappropriate 
Improved  
Not Significant  
Not Significant  
Reduced 
Availability of procedures/plans Appropriate 
Acceptable 
Inappropriate 
Improved  
Not Significant  
Reduced 
Number of simultaneous goals Fewer than capacity  
Matching current capacity  
More than capacity 
Not Significant  
Not Significant  
Reduced 
Available time Sufficient 
Temporarily sufficient 
Consistently insufficient 
Improved  
Not Significant  
Reduced 
Time of day Day 
Night 
Not Significant  
Reduced 
Adequacy of training and expertise Adequate, wide experience 
Inadequate, limited experience 
Inadequate 
Improved  
Not Significant  
Reduced 
Quality of collaboration Very efficient 
Efficient 
Inefficient 
Deficient 
Improved  
Not Significant  
Not Significant  
Reduced 
Effectiveness of communication Suitable 
Acceptable 
Unsuitable 
Improved  
Not Significant  
Reduced 
As Table 1 shows, CPCs cover a wide spectrum of activities. They are defined generically 
and should be tailored to the work situation at hand. However, the assessment principle 
remains the same: it consists of a systematic examination of each CPC. We will now take 
‘Working conditions’ as an example. 
1. The analyst collects the necessary information (position, light, dust, heat, noise, 
humidity, odour, etc.2) from the situation being assessed. 
2. Working conditions can then be assessed as ‘advantageous, ‘compatible’ or 
‘incompatible’. 
3. The final step in the evaluation of the CPC is to determine the corresponding 
expected effect on performance (‘improved, ‘not significant’ or ‘reduced’). 
When CREAM is deployed as a screening technique for accident analysis, CPCs are used to 
evaluate in a simple but systematic way the conditions under which a particular level of 
performance was obtained. Because these conditions are seen as a factor that determines 
performance, it is essential to understand them, as they form a major element in the 
characterisation of the causes of human failure. 
The next section describes the process undertaken by GrDF in order to tailor CPCs to the 
domain of gas distribution and the consequent deployment of a prototype analysis grid. 
                                               
 
2 These descriptors, as well as those belonging to the other CPCs, have not been included in Table 1 in order to 
maintain legibility. 
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4. Development of the prototype and CPCs 
The process of co-design and development of the analysis grid can be likened to the 
‘waterfall’ model of software engineering (see e.g. Sommerville, 1995). The latter is divided 
into five phases: requirements specification, system and software design, implementation and 
unit testing, integration and system testing, and deployment. The screening grid was 
developed in three phases (Figure 1) which overlap with those of the waterfall model: 
1. The prototyping stage groups the two phases of requirements specification, and 
system and software design. 
2. The test phase at pilot sites corresponds to the phases of implementation and testing. 
3. The final stages of development and deployment mirror those of the waterfall model. 
Professionals from the Risk Management Centre (GrDF) contributed their knowledge of site 
management and operating procedures in the operational environment. Specialists from the 
Centre for research on Risks and Crises (Mines ParisTech) brought their expertise in the use 
of the method. The Research Department of GDF-SUEZ provided technical support in the 
development of the initial analysis grid and participated in benchmarking exercises at 
operational sites. 
 
Stages 
Stakeholders 
Prototyping Testing at pilot sites 
Final development and 
deployment 
Risk Management Centre 
GrDF 
Contributed their 
understanding of the 
business and knowledge of 
operational constraints 
Managed field trials  Provided a link with the 
Information Services Division 
Managed training 
Managers of the process of 
learning from operational 
experience 
  First management cohort 
trained 
Trained subordinates 
GDF-SUEZ Innovation and 
Research Department 
Contributed their in-house 
knowledge 
 Provided technical support in 
the development of the initial 
versions of the analysis grid 
Centre for research on Risks 
and Crises (Mines 
ParisTech) 
Contributed their knowledge 
of the CREAM method  
  
GrDF employees Provided details of specific 
requirements 
Provided feedback of 
problems encountered 
between the design of the 
grid and operational 
constraints 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the process of co-construction of the analysis grid 
The screening grid (Figure 2) was developed in three stages: 
1. Creation of a prototype. A major part of this step was to adapt the original CPC 
vocabulary to the gas distribution business. This was achieved by bringing together 
business and operational experts. The grid was implemented in a spreadsheet to 
make it easier for all the various stakeholders to participate in its development, and 
to simplify its dissemination to pilot sites. Details of this phase of co-development 
can be found in Besnard et al. (2009). 
2. Testing at pilot sites. This step consisted of field trials that capitalised on user 
feedback. Tests were conducted in March and April 2009 on operational sites in the 
Paris area. Each trial was an opportunity to apply the grid to a real-life situation and 
gather both feedback and feature requests. 
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3. Final development and deployment. The last step made it possible to capitalise on 
feedback from the pilot sites and to produce a final version of the grid. Regional 
managers were trained, with the task of training their own local managers. By the 
end of the first half of 2009, and six months after the start of prototyping, personnel 
at all the operating sites had been trained. At this point, the method was deployed 
nationally in the eighteen units that comprise the GrDF gas network. The 
integration with the nation-wide computer system took place the following year. 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of the graphical interface of the final version of the screening grid, showing the menu of 
response options 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This interface was used for all the adapted CPCs. The process was thorough to the 
extent that even the name evolved: CPCs were renamed into Task Execution Conditions 
(TECs) for internal communication purposes. Also, an important objective was to adapt 
generic TECs to the reality of work. Therefore, additional specific sub-criteria were 
introduced to reflect real-life conditions (Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Materials and tools 
Storage and availability 
For this intervention, were tools and materials in their usual places? Were they easy to access? Were the various 
workspaces and means of transport free from obstruction? Were the tools required for the intervention (specified in the 
work order) available? Was there adequate storage space? Was transport available?  
 
Describe how storage conditions or the availability of tools or materials affected the event or intervention 
 
What was the cause of the malfunction (if there was one)? 
Prime factor Aggravating 
The conditions created by storage and availability were the following… Irrelevant 
No impact 
Very unfavourable 
Unfavourable 
Favourable 
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Table 2: List of TECs and their sub-criteria 
TEC Sub-criteria 
Working conditions 1. Working environment 
2. Personal protective equipment 
3. Temperature, noise, light 
Materials and tools 4. Availability of a tool suitable for the task at hand 
5. Condition of tools and vehicles 
6. Storage and availability 
7. IT equipment 
Regulations and procedures 8. Description of tasks in procedures and the relevance of procedures 
9. Deployment and availability 
10. Compliance with procedures 
Mapping and designation 11. Availability of mapping for GrDF field operators 
12. Maps correspond to the terrain 
13. Underground maps correspond to the terrain 
14. Consistent mapping 
15. Designation of facilities 
Workload 16. Actors undertake more than one activity at a time 
17. Rhythm of work 
Time management 18. Preparation 
19. Execution 
20. Break points to assess the situation 
Professionalism 21. Knowledge 
22. Know-how 
23. Skills 
Collaboration 24. Sub-contractors respect contract terms 
25. Working agreements with fire services are followed 
26. Team-working 
27. Shared means and objectives 
28. Collaboration and respect for roles within the team 
29. Distribution of skills 
Communication 30. Business language 
31. Communication methods 
32. Traceable/adequate internal information 
33. Impact of external information on event management 
Technical management 34. Decision-making chain 
35. Management of gas flow 
36. Condition, accessibility and maintenance of facility 
37. Design/operation of facilities 
 
5. Limitations and benefits of the analysis grid 
The introduction of the new analysis grid took place in a context of profound 
organisational change. In addition to the paradigm shift in the analysis of accidents which 
required managers to master a new mind-set, other limitations to the assimilation of the 
method became apparent. These were identified at three phases: in the design of the grid, its 
implementation and particularly, its use. While the design and implementation phases did not 
give rise to significant difficulties, the operational phase proved to be more challenging.  
5.1. Limitations of the grid 
Four limitations were found when using the grid in operational conditions.  Cost of analysis. Managers frequently found that the introduction of the screening grid 
was an unwelcome additional task that was incompatible both in terms of time and 
contents with the many on-going field interventions.  Cost of capitalisation. The increased complexity of the analysis increased the amount 
of information to be collected and analysed. The cost of the capitalisation of this 
information rose, since it required managers to spend time formatting data before 
disseminating the results of the analysis. This additional workload diminished interest 
in the grid and made it difficult to provide rapid feedback to operators. A computer 
application partially remedied this problem. 
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 Lack of support from senior management. A fourth limitation was the feeling of lack 
of interest on the part of the managers in charge of industrial safety. Despite the 
additional training and on-demand methodological support provided, a sense of 
isolation was noted. The impression was that the increased cost of accident analysis 
was not being taken into account.  Search for those responsible. At the beginning of the deployment, very few of the 
analyses proved useful due to a lack of understanding of the implementation of the 
concept, which was interpreted in the context of dependability. This misunderstanding 
obscured the search for deeper causes in favour of the allocation of blame. 
Paradoxically, interviews with employees revealed a keen interest in the new method, 
which was seen as being capable of overcoming the limitations of previous practice. 
The latter was a) a heterogeneous collection of reliability assessment methods that was 
used also in the domain of human and organisational factors. 
To some extent, the difficulties above tie back to the culture of the fault tree analysis. The 
latter was designed as a binary framework (the behaviour is right or wrong) where only those 
facts that can be observed directly can be analysed. It follows that a) departing from the 
notion of error and b) analysing the context of a human action implied a massive cultural 
shift. What is more, this shift implied a higher cost, which did not ease the adoption of the 
new TEC-based grid. 
5.2. Benefits of the grid 
In the two-year period since the implementation of the analysis grid, several points have 
emerged which demonstrate that its introduction has improved working practices. 
 Fault tree analysis is less used. Historically, this method had been widely used by the 
company, including for the analysis of human actions. The introduction of the 
screening grid provided a solution to two problems. First, it made it possible to bypass 
the concept of human error and second, it enabled an analysis to be made of the 
performance conditions of operators. However, because the method depended heavily 
on the expertise of the person responsible for the analysis, the initial results lacked 
consistency. In its current implementation, the analysis grid supports the convergence 
of safety information. This has made it possible for operators and managers to 
systematically collect and manipulate data.  Unification of operating data. It became possible to capitalise operational information 
related to safety that had previously only been available piecemeal. Following the 
analysis of hundreds of accidents, it became possible to identify the weakest structures 
in the network. These consisted, for the most part, of the principal network 
connections, which accounted for more than 80% of the facilities involved in 
incidents. In over 80% of these cases, an identified cause of the accident was a lack of 
knowledge of the network on the part of an external company carrying out work, 
partially due to structures not being identified.  Perceived usefulness for safety. The CPCs were perceived as a means to achieve a 
depth of analysis useful for improving safety. By using CREAM as a screening 
technique rather than the extended method, the analysis grid helped users to 
understand the concept of performance conditions. It should be noted that the 
perception of what constitutes a depth of analysis useful for improving safety is the 
subject of debate. As Perret (1996) suggests, change in an organization creates 
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ambivalent perceptions among people concerned, affecting safety results in return. 
Learning from past experience can therefore have its global efficiency reduced since 
these perceptions may lead people to develop defensive attitudes, as Argyris (1978) 
describes in his Model 1 theory.   Integration of safety managers. Another positive result was the increased exchange of 
information and discussion. Transparency was improved and mutual understanding 
between the various operating sites of their local working conditions increased. A non-
technical aspect of the analysis grid was that it functioned as a medium of dialogue 
between operators and the managers (both local and national) in charge of risk 
management. This promoted the emergence of an integrated safety culture (see for 
example Groeneweg et al., 2002). In turn, there was greater scope for dialogue and 
understanding of the causes of errors. The progressive re-evaluation of the role of 
sanctions made it possible to maintain an active flow of information to safety 
managers at a national level. 
6. Discussion 
The introduction of the analysis grid represented a paradigm shift in accident analysis 
practices, which evolved considerably. However, it is not clear whether a corresponding 
improvement in safety management can be demonstrated. On the one hand, trade-offs 
emerged between the cost of using the new grid and available resources. On the other hand, 
positive side-effects were noted. These two phenomena are discussed in the following 
sections. 
6.1. Trade-offs 
Several difficulties were identified during the deployment of the grid, both for managers 
and operators. For example, it took longer to carry out an analysis with the grid than before. 
This degraded the quality of the accident analysis and consequently, the ability of the 
company to obtain a realistic overview of the causes of accidents. 
The work of Simon (1957) on limited rationality demonstrates that with equal resources, 
new problems call for trade-offs. Therefore, it was important to identify the trade-offs that 
were triggered in response to the deployment of the screening grid. Those identified were:  Trade-off between depth of analysis and usability of the grid. The new paradigm led to 
the development of a new accident analysis grid. Consequently, operators and 
managers in the field were not familiar with it. The frequently-heard argument that the 
tool lacked usability bore witness to the difficulty of adjusting to the new paradigm. 
The trade-off between comprehensiveness and perceived complexity was most 
difficult to arbitrate. 
 Trade-off between depth of analysis and workload. At GrDF, local accident analysis 
teams are composed of the same personnel who perform interventions on the gas 
network. The time spent carrying out an accident analysis using the grid (rather than 
running the traditional, unsupported debriefing) was considered to be time that could 
be have been spent on interventions. The corresponding threat was that in order to 
meet production constraints, the accident analysis could be superficial or triggered 
only in the case of major accidents. 
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 Trade-off between criticality and workload. This trade-off is related to the previous 
one. The idea of perceived criticality makes it possible to mediate between the choice 
of events to be analysed and the time available. The threat to safety lies in changing 
the criticality threshold of an accident and an implicit re-evaluation of the definition of 
an incident.  Trade-off between performance management and the management of operators. 
Organisational changes modified the responsibilities of those in charge of carrying out 
the analyses. Following the introduction of the analysis grid, local managers were 
required to manage a double bind: the performance requirements of senior managers 
and complaints from emergency response teams who saw changes in the substance of 
their job. 
6.2. Side effects of the paradigm shift 
The implementation of TECs to analyse performance provided a solution to the paradox of 
learning from operational experience. Experience shows that only analysing unwanted events 
poses a fundamental problem for safety. The decreasing number of accidents and incidents 
gradually deprives the organisation of incoming data from which safety is managed. In other 
words, when the process only learns from the experience of unwanted events, the extent to 
which system safety is under control can only be assessed if accidents occur. It cannot 
otherwise be demonstrated that safety barriers are working. While senior managers claim that 
safety comes first, the accident (and the loss of control that it represents) is still, 
paradoxically, the only means available to determine if the system was safe. 
The approach above only attempts to limit the consequences of unwanted events. Positive 
performance (the absence of accidents) is not taken into account. Because it is expected, it is 
considered to be normal and is not given any particular value in terms of learning. In this view 
of safety, the individual is simply a resource that carries out prescribed actions. Safety is then 
seen as the result of compliance with specific procedures and the use of appropriate tools. 
Furthermore, the sense that operators make of their activity is discounted, as is the 
significance of the organisational context in the industrial process, as Davoudian et al. (1994) 
describe. 
The attribution of error to operators described by Reason (1997) is a result of the line of 
reasoning described above. Instead, the analysis grid and the TECs encouraged discussions. It 
set the focus on identifying the causes of accidents rather than finding what operators did 
wrong. In doing so, it got the company away from the vision where accidents result from a 
lack of knowledge or discipline in the application of tools and procedures.  
The decision to integrate the paradigm of TECs into safety management had consequences 
that went beyond the scope of accident analysis. One of the areas affected was the training of 
local managers. Traditional training courses, oriented towards obtaining practical and 
theoretical skills, were revised. This was complemented by the design and development of a 
simulated operations desk with scenarios created from actual accident analysis reports. 
Learning from operational experience in general, and the accident analysis grid described 
here, are much more than a tool for the capitalisation of incidental knowledge in a socio-
technical system. In fact, they go beyond the sphere of safety by offering opportunities for 
discussion and debates about new practices. On this last point, learning from operational 
experience is genuinely useful for the creation, or strengthening of a safety culture. Safety no 
longer emerges as the result of the implementation of procedures or the monitoring of 
indicators, but rather as the result of a collective effort. 
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A sharp difference was also found between age groups. A whole generation of the 
organisation’s employees had become accustomed to the use of the concepts of error and 
sanction in a ‘legal’ sense. These employees attempted to minimise the differences between 
their understanding of these concepts and the new paradigm. For them, only time and on-
going support can bring about a change in attitude. Management must now take into account 
this generational issue as well as the wide cultural spectrum present in the company. 
7. Conclusion 
The first lesson to be learned from this exercise is that the design and deployment of a 
tool such as our accident analysis grid is not just a technical change. Such beliefs on the part 
of management are counter-productive. The approach can only be said to have succeeded if it 
is accepted by the daily end-users. The deployment demonstrated the importance of 
‘participatory prototyping’. The latter responded to the criticism, commonly heard from 
operations staff, that national policy-makers impose new tools without taking into account the 
daily technical constraints and available human resources. 
The participatory development method chosen imposed an important related constraint: 
participation must continue beyond the design phase. If this does not happen, local 
workaround strategies may take hold in an attempt to circumvent the constraints of the grid. 
In turn, this would deprive managers from signs that unacceptable practices have become 
everyday work. Vaughan (1996) terms this the normalisation of deviance and is known to 
have been involved in industrial catastrophes. Therefore, national managers must be prepared 
to provide communication channels and on-going training in order to maintain continuous 
improvement in the organisational learning processes. 
Another consequence of the introduction of TECs was a disruption to existing management 
practices. Embodying a new view of human error (Dekker, 2007) made the concepts of error 
and sanction more difficult to understand. As a consequence, management practices had to be 
adapted. Otherwise, the learning from operational experience process would only rediscover 
the same limited causes of failure. Implicitly, this illustrates the prescriptive power of safety 
management tools and highlights the challenges lying ahead of GrDF.  
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